If there is one line that riles me more than most in a war that has been replete with seductive soundbites, it is that “Ukraine’s defence is our defence”. Beloved by European and British politicians, this assertion rarely draws any public challenge, and my own dissent has so far been limited to a feeble ‘No it isn’t’ on social media. Recently, though, a trio of security luminaries has set out to explain why they think Ukraine’s defence is indeed our defence or, as put less pithily in their title, why they believe that “in helping Ukraine we are protecting ourselves”.
The three are Dr Greg Mills and Dr Karin von Hippel, both fellows at the London think-tank, the Royal United Services Institute, and Raimundo Robredo, described as a guest contributor. You can find their contribution - https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/helping-ukraine-we-protect-ourselves - on the RUSI website, where, in common with all outside contributions, it carries a disclaimer to the effect that its publication here does not imply RUSI’s endorsement.
Mills et al, as I will refer to them from now on, couch their argument as a two-part answer to what they concede is a fair question being asked by Western governments and people alike: why should they keep sending billions of dollars to Ukraine; .what’s in it for us? They also invite a debate. So here is my opportunity.
Mills et al make their case in two parts. In the first, they argue that Russia poses a threat “to all democracies” and “not just to its immediate neighbours”. Hence everyone should pile in to support Ukraine and pre-empt this threat. In the second, they argue that what is also in it for us is the example that Ukraine has set, both in the military advancements it has pioneered and the strength of Ukrainians’ resilience, but also in the way they have stood up for moral values. This moral resistance cannot be allowed to fail, or we are all doomed.
Let’s look at the first argument more closely. What is their evidence for saying that Russia threatens all democracies? Well, they don’t actually offer any, they simply take it is read, as a self-evident truth. But it isn’t.
If they had tried to support it, I submit that their arguments might have included first, that Russia invaded democratic Georgia in 2008 (it didn’t; as found by an EU commissioned investigation, led by the Swiss diplomat, Heidi Tagliavini, which said Russia had responded to actions by the mercurial Georgian leader, Mikheil Saakashvili. And, second, that Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea and its 2022 invasion of Ukraine originated in the fear that the example of a thriving democracy next door might foment unrest in Russia. I don’t buy that argument either.
Russia lived peacefully alongside independent Ukraine through the 2004-5 Orange revolution and pursued normal relations with Ukraine after the election of a fiercely pro-Western President, Viktor Yushchenko. The difference between the Orange Revolution and Russia’s interventions in 2014 (the annexation of Crimea) and 2022 was not democracy, but Ukraine’s decision to abandon its constitutional neutrality and aim for membership of Nato. Insecurity, not democracy, was the trigger.
Then how about the specific charge that Russia threatens “all democracies”, not just its immediate neighbours. Here, their claims focus on so-called hybrid warfare. Russia, they say, has spent “the past decade inflicting sub-threshold attacks against most Nato allies”, which include cyber and drone attacks on critical infrastructure, disconnecting undersea cables, on warehouses etc. Such attacks, they say, have intensified over the past year, while still falling below threshold that would require a kinetic, i.e. a full military, response.
Even if some such attacks can be laid at Russia’s door - and, it should be stressed that far from all attacks claimed by Nato members have been found, on examination, to originate with Russia - see Thomas Fazi, Evidence of a Russian 'hybrid war' in Europe is vanishingly thin | Responsible Statecraft - there is no reason to assume that Russia intends such attacks as a prelude to any wider or deeper assault on Europe’s democracies.
There are, in fact, several reasons why Russia might be doing this, which would include responding to similar (generally unreported) attacks initiated by Ukraine and its Western supporters, and a deliberate decision to avoid any action that could trigger a wider war. I would suggest these are more convincing explanations for what Russia is doing than preparing to move against Western democracies.
Indeed, if you note the lack of any stated Russian threats to European democracies - save in response to their support for Ukrainian attacks on Russia - and add to this Russia’s failure, forced or planned, over more than four years to advance its forces even as far as the Dnipro River in Ukraine, then you have to ask why anyone would conclude that Russia’s ambitions, hybrid or other, extend even as far as the western edge of Ukraine, let alone to the Baltic States, Poland, or even, as some of the wider-eyed fantasists might claim, Berlin. As supporting evidence, I might add that in recent weeks, some Baltic leaders - hitherto among the most hawkish Europeans vis a vis Russia - have taken pains to dampen down the more alarmist Western warnings about imminent Russian aggression.
To give them their due, Mills et al do not go quite so far as to accuse Russia of preparing a full attack on a democratic Nato ally. What they posit is that it can be only a matter of time before “one of these /lower-level Russian/ attacks triggers a response above the threshold”. What they neglect to point out is that, in that event, any decision on an escalatory response would be ours. And we could choose to stop baiting Russia, cease our own low-level, sub-kinetic, attacks, and keep out of - or withdraw from - what began in 2014 as a Ukrainian civil war, grew into a limited bilateral Ukraine-Russia conflict when Russia intervened in 2014 on behalf of the anti-Kyiv rebels, and threatened a wider war only when the US and Europeans weighed in on Ukraine’s side with ever more money, intelligence and powerful weapons.
It is not as though such an outcome was not envisaged. In 2014, then US President Barack Obama declined to supply lethal military aid to Ukraine for fear of just such an escalation. He understood that Ukraine was a “core national interest” for Russia, but not for the US, which should not go down a path that could lead to a US-Russia war.
The irony now is that, despite Ukraine not being a member of Nato, and despite its Nato aspirations having been placed on the back-burner at the 2008 Bucharest summit, thanks to the opposition of several allies, Ukraine is now the only country, ever, to be benefiting from military protection equivalent to Nato’s famed Article 5. This is a position, what is more, that Nato has meandered into without any of the consultation stipulated in the actual Article 5.
Which is where we should return to the facile assertion that “Ukraine’s defence is our defence”. If Ukraine’s defence can in any way be defined as our defence, it is in the reverse of how that slogan is used in the context of the Russia-Ukraine war, which sees doughty Ukraine as a bulwark for the rest of Europe against an aggressive Russia. This is not what is happening. What is happening is that, by giving Ukraine de facto Nato protection, we have not only assumed responsibility for Ukraine’s defence, but jeopardised our own by importing Ukraine’s insecurity. By supporting Ukraine militarily, we have eliminated what had been a buffer zone, and replaced it with a zone of potentially long-term instability on our eastern flank.
It is worth recalling that, after Russia’s 2022 invasion, at least some Nato countries understood how dangerous a stand-off between Nato and Russia could be and spent the first two years of the conflict keeping Nato at arm’s length from the fray. Supplies of weapons and money were agreed on a bilateral, country-to-country basis, and special non-Nato mechanisms were set up to coordinate them. There was also, you may remember, that “coalition of the willing”.
All this was done not only to smoothe over differences within the alliance, but to prevent what is now manifest today: Nato becoming embroiled in what is fast becoming not just a proxy, but a real, war with Russia. In defending Ukraine, we are not protecting ourselves, far from it. We are exposing ourselves to a Russia threat that we have helped to bring into being by challenging what Obama understood was a core Russian interest.
If the first part of the case presented by Mills et al for Ukraine’s defence being our defence can at very least be contested, their second part, to me, makes even less sense, except in a world that does not, and has never, existed. Defending Ukraine is to defend ourselves because - to cut a long explanation short - Ukraine presents a superior form of warriors and war and one that we need to learn from.
At the practical level, Ukraine’s defence, they argue, is our defence, because we will benefit from the strides it has made in developing military equipment and tactics. These include its nimble approach to innovation, as well as its drones and all that. Well, maybe. But, as a few sceptics are already noting - e.g. https://mwi.westpoint.edu/the-menace-of-misunderstanding-learning-the-wrong-lessons-from-ukraines-drone-saturated-battlefields/ - the applicability for Europeans of this Ukrainian model can be exaggerated. As in the past, our generals risk being seduced into fighting the last war. You might add that if European defence needs anything, it is less nimble entrepreneurialism than more cohesion and consolidation. Nor should it be neglected how quickly and effectively Russia has caught up both in drone technology and in satellite communications. Maybe the example we need to learn from is Russia’s?
Which is certainly not something Mills et al would favour, because the other aspect of what they say we need to learn from Ukraine is not technical or organisational, but moral. This reflects not just the argument that Ukraine, as the invaded country, has right on its side, but their observation that in its resilience, its spiritual strength and its conduct of the war, Ukraine has set an example for everyone, and may in some respects it has. But the way the two sides have really conducted themselves will be apparent only after the hostilities are over, and Ukraine has done an excellent job of proclaiming its own virtue.
You don’t have to go so far as to question the widely accepted version of the killings in Bucha early on in the war - though what happened may be murkier than generally presented - to argue that not all on Ukraine’s side is quite so exemplary as it might seem. Whether in the treatment of Prisoners of War, in the ways it is press-ganging troops, in its insistence that its forces fight on even when the battle is lost, or in the use of US-supplied cluster munitions - which are apparently legal when used by Ukraine, but not in the hands of Russia.
Personally, I would not hold much of this against Ukraine. I accept with regret that war is war. But the resilience and solidarity that Mills et al so admire and recommend for emulation are less specific to Ukrainians and less specific to this war than they seem to believe. They are qualities shown by many a nation fighting what it sees as an existential war. Blitz spirit, anyone? How does any of this make Ukraine’s defence “our defence”?
Of course, it can be argued that Ukraine is on the right side of history, and must be helped to prevail, lest might is seen even more than it already is as right. But again, while this might be an admirable view, it has several serious flaws. The first concerns who is judging. In the case of Russia and Ukraine, the UN proved inadequate to mediate, in part because Russia could wield its Security Council veto, but also because the Europeans, who could have set themselves up as arbiters in their own neighbourhood, rushed to a simplistic judgement, which invited charges of hypocrisy from those who remembered Bosnia and Iraq, to name but two.
Another is the intervention of national interests. Is it, to start close to home, really in the UK’s national interest to be spending so much on defending Ukraine? However much this and previous governments have tried to muddy the waters of spending on Ukraine, it cannot but eat into the resources that we might need to defend ourselves, or our actual allies, or even sustain living standards at home?
And a third might be practical: the UK and the Europeans together simply do not possess either the moral or material clout that would be needed to recover Ukraine’s lost territory from Russia. In that respect, Ukraine’s defence cannot be our defence, because it is beyond our means, with or without taking account of the national interest.
Given this reality, our obligation should be to work with Ukraine to secure the best terms it can possibly get to end the war. That process, which has barely advanced since the aborted agreement in Istanbul three months after Russia’s invasion, will not be furthered by certain British and European politicians shouting at every opportunity that Ukraine’s defence is our defence. For the truth is that, if Ukraine wants to be a sovereign independent state, it must be able to look to its own defence, secured whether through force of arms or mutually beneficial alliances. The fate of Ukraine will not determine the fate of the rest of Europe, and the defence of Ukraine, in the end, is no one’s responsibility but its own.
At one point in their article, Mills etc, seem to nod to this awkward reality, when they say that “in todayʼs more mercantilist geopolitical framework, where countries have interests before friends, relying on a willing Ukrainian military to confront the Russians with Western treasure is cheaper than having to invest Western blood”. Now just read that again. Nato and/or the West, whichever you prefer, is supplying Ukrainians - geographically peripheral Europeans - with the wherewithal to fight and die for the cause of democracy in “our” Europe. This seems even to me, as a hard-bitten foreign policy realist, distasteful cynicism. How is that desirable. How is that morally right?
It is certainly an interpretation that can be placed on the proposition that “Ukraine’s defence is our defence”. But would any European government be happy to spell it out in such mercenary terms? Unless, that is, Russia were really at our gates - which, first, it isn’t, and, second, it is unlikely to be, so long as it either can’t or doesn’t intend to advance beyond eastern Ukraine.
From now on, assuming the Europeans persist in their delusion about Ukraine’s defence being our, or their, defence, a devastated Ukraine will be at once a creature and a protectorate of the Europeans - at vast expense to European exchequers. Ukrainians may prefer that sort of patronage to the betwixt and between status they experienced from 1991-2014 as an independent state. But by taking Ukraine’s side to the extent we have, the Europeans have taken on a burden they would have been a lot better off without.
In all these respects, it can be argued, our defence of Ukraine has turned out to be very the opposite of our defence. We have ruined our hitherto stable neighbourhood and racked up enormous liabilities, while in effect moving the Cold War border a few hundred kilometres to the east, without any of the arms control and security treaties that used to govern that divide for the benefit of both sides. That is, to put it mildly, not a good return on all that we have invested in Ukraine’s defence so far, and seem intent on continuing “for as long as it takes”.
ends


I read stuff about Ukraine all the time. I don't care if it comes from "Russian propaganda" or from "Supernationalist Ukraine supporters" or people in the middle. I look for - if it makes sense. And this article is the best thing I've read in a long time.
It looks at Ukraine's interest, at Russia's interest, at Europe's interest - probably should include USA's and Israel's.
And it recognises that this war is something of a playground for Western new gee-whiz military and surveillance toys, (and that should included Israeli toys , too.)
And it, perhaps all too briefly, notes the absurd moral arguments that give Ukraine and its peripatetic leader some sort of spiritual magic - of superior goodness to the rest of us plebs,
This is an excellent article, thank you. I think in a particular point could have dugg deeper. The cybersecurity and cyberattacks. Should we understand that because the Russians, the Chinese, the Iranians don't complain, the west is not deep into conducting cyberwarfare on its "enemies"? Just pure white doves? Then why the tools in Vault 7 or Stuxnet? It would be interesting to see a tally of Western cyber attacks against enemies like Russia, and vice-versa...